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At common law, it is well established that on a bank deposit the bank1 is obligated to the cus-
tomer as a debtor on a loan2 and under an 'added ... obligation ... to honour the customer's 
[orders]3 to any amount not exceeding the credit balance'.4 As for the scope of that 'added ... 
obligation', the starting point has been that as 'custodians of the customer's money' providing 
for 'a safe place of deposit',5 '[b]ankers can only charge their customers with sums of money 
paid pursuant to order' as given by the customer. 6 In relation to written payment orders, 
bankers 'are bound to know the hand-writing of their customers',7 and certainly their signa-
tures. 8 Hence, banks bear losses caused by payment of forged payment instructions even in 
the case of a skilful forgery which is unobservable 'in the ordinary course of business' .9 In 
sum, being 'the depositary of the customer's money', a banker 'is bound to pay from time to 
time such sums as the latter may order'; where 'unfortunately [the banker] pays money 
belonging to the customer upon an order which is not genuine, he must suffer, and to justify 
* LLB (Jerusalem) LLM SID (Harvard). Professor of Law at the Osgoode Hall Law School, York Uni-
versity, and Counsel at Torys LLP, Toronto, Canada. This essay draws on, and puts in a broader per-
spective, B Geva Law of Electronic Funds Transfers (loose-leaf) § 2.05[ 4]. See also B Geva 'Unauthorized 
electronic funds transfers - comparative aspects', paper presented at the Eighth Biennial Conference of 
the International Academy of Commercial and Consumer Law, Bar Ilan University, August 1996, pub-
lished in JS Ziegel (ed) New Developments in Intemational Commercial and Consumer Law (1998) 107-
133 and B Geva Bank Collections and Payment Transactions (2001) 392-421. Research assistance 
funding was provided in part by the Foundation of the Legal Research of the Canadian Bar Association. 
For research assistance, I am grateful to Yiyu T Zheng of the Osgoode 2014 graduating class. 
1 'Bank' as well as 'banker' are loosely used in this essay interchangeably to connote a person taking 
deposits from the public and complying with transfer orders of depositors as to the credit available in their 
respective accounts. Money deposited with banks is typically lent by them in their own name. This feature 
is not relevant for the present discussion. Historically, the banking business was run by an individual (or 
individual partners) and hence the person is referred to as 'banker'. At present, it is universal for such 
business to be incorporated so as to be a 'bank'. Both terms are used here also to cover those who comply 
with their customers' transfer orders out of a line of credit and not only funds deposited in an account. 
2 Foley v Hill (1848) 2 HLC 28; 9 ER 1002 (HL). 
3 This essay uses 'orders', payment orders', and 'transfer orders' interchangeably. Note that earlier cases 
dealt with orders embodied in paper instruments, such as cheques and other bills of exchange or drafts, 
and not in wire payment orders. There is, however, nothing in these cases to limit them to negotiable 
instruments or any other category of orders. The difference between a manual signature and an electronic 
authorization is another matter, addressed further below. 
4 Joachimson v Swiss Bank [1921] 3 KB 110 (CA) at 127 (per Atkin J). 
5 National Bank of Virginia v Nolting 1897 26 SE 826 (Va SC) at 828 (per Harrison J). 
6 Hall v Fuller (1825) 5 BC 750 at 757; 108 ER 279 at 282 (per Abbot CJ). The case involved a customer's 
order subsequently altered without customer's authority. 
7 Smith v Mercer (1815) 6 Taunt 76 at 86; 128 ER 961at965 (per Heath J). 
8 James Barr Ames 'The doctrine of Price v. Neal', in Lectures on Legal Hist01y and Miscellaneous Legal 
Essays (1913) 270-271. 
9 Hall v Fuller supra note 6 at 756 (BC); 282 (ER). 
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the payment he must show that the order is genume, not m signature only, but in every 
n:ereci" , io 
OvET the years" nlbeit less so in connection v,rith consumer accounts, 11 the bank's absolute 
liability became subject to exceptions. Paiiicularly, bypassing a classical text explicitly to the 
contrary, 12 it had been recognized that a custo111er's fault can lead to the forgery of the 
customer's own signature and hence to forgery losses. The door was thus opened for a bank 
which paid over an unauthorized payment order to avoid liability not only where the customer 
had been aware of the unauthorized order13 but also by invoking the customer's negligence in 
facilitating the issue of the unauthorized payment instructions. In the United States of 
America,14 and subsequently in South Africa, 15 the bank's right is codified. In England16 and 
Canada, 17 such a right must be provided by contract. 18 Accordingly, the rule was modified to 
make the bank's liability less absolute so as to be avoided where fault lay with the customer. 
It was thus said that '[i]f the bank pays money on a forged check, no matter under what cir-
cumstances of caution, or however honest the belief in its genuineness, if the depositor him-
self be free of blame, and has done nothing to mislead the bank, all the loss must be borne by 
the bank, for it acts at its peril, and pays out its own funds, and not those of the depositor'. 19 
Nonetheless, there are circumstances in which a bank may seek to be released from liability 
for payment of unauthorized orders even where neither knowledge nor negligence can be 
attributed to the customer. Thus, in practice, a customer's payment order is transmitted to its20 
bank either by the delivery of a piece of paper or electronically.21 Sender's authority is thus 
verified by the receiving bank22 with the view of authenticating the co111111unication either by 
10 At 7 57 (BC); 282 (ER) (per Bayley J). 
11 See, for example, the Electronic Fund Transfer Act (EFTA) 15 USC§§ 1693 et seq in the United States of 
America, where a consumer's exposure is limited regardless of negligence facilitating an unauthorized 
funds transfer. 
12 RJ Pothier Traite du contract du change (new ed by JB Hutteau ( ed)) (1809) 55-68. His overall position 
is explored in Benjamin Geva Bank Collections and Payment Transactions (2001) 349-351. He analysed 
the point as an issue under mandate law which is the general framework governing the execution and 
collection of payment orders in South Africa. See FR Malan and JT Pretorius 'Bills of Exchange, Cheques 
and Promissory Notes' § 7, around note 55 in ABLU'96 (Annual Banking Law Update 1996). On the 
particular point in the accompanying text his view is certainly anachronistic. 
13 See, for example, Greenwood v Martins Bank Ltd [1933] AC 5 (HL); Ewing v Dominion Bank (1905) 35 
SCR 133 (Canada). 
14 See UCC s 3-406. 
15 Section 72B of the Bills of Exchange Act 34 of 1964 (among other provisions), inserted by the Bills of 
Exchange Amendment Act 56 of2000. 
16 See, for example, Tai Hing Cotton Mill Ltdv Liu Chong Hing Bank Ltd [1985] 3 WLR 317 (PC). 
17 See, for example, Canadian Pacific Hotels Ltd v Bank of Montreal (1987) 40 DLR (4th) 385 (SCC). 
18 Much of the discussion and even a resulting statutory provision (such as UCC 4-406 in the United States 
of America) on the customer's negligence addresses the specific obligation of examining and verifying 
banks' periodic statements and advising the bank of any discrepancy (including an unauthorized pay-
ment). The breach of such a duty may reduce the bank's chances of identifying and recovering from the 
wrongdoer and allow a repeating wrongdoer to issue future unauthorized orders. 
19 Hardy v Chesapeake Bank (1879) 51 Md 562 *11 (per Alvey J). 
20 Most business customers are incorporated. 
21 In principle, communication may be oral, except that typically an oral communication is followed by 
either a signed written confinnation or a verification according to an agreed-upon 'security procedure' of 
the type discussed further below. 
22 In the footsteps ofUCC s 4A-103, throughout this essay, the tern1s 'sender' and 'receiving bank' are the 
parties to a 'payment order' issued in the course ofa wire transfer. On UCC article 4A in the United States 
of America, see, generally, note 26 below. 
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the examination of the signature or according to a security procedure. A signature is indi-
vidual to each person so that its verification confirms the identity of the signer. This is, of 
course, correct also in relation to a corporate customer which obligates itself by the signature 
of designated signatories whose signatures are on file with the bank. At the same time, the 
verification according to a security procedure serves as a legitimization of the communication 
without the identification of the individual sender who actually issued it. 
In the absence of a manual signature, banks are unable to link a payment order with an indi-
vidual who issued it. True, banks remain perceived as 'custodians of the customer's money' 
providing for 'a safe place of deposit' .23 At the same time, where the identification of the 
issuer cannot be ascertained by the bank, the rationale for the bank's absolute liability for an 
unauthorized payment order, as stated above, becomes significantly weaker. Unsurprisingly 
then, American authorities dealing with negotiable instruments have given full effect to cor-
porate resolutions authorizing the use of facsimile signatures to bind corporate entities. 24 This 
must be correct in England as wel!.25 
Acting on a contractually agreed electronic authorization is in principle not different from 
acting on a facsimile signature affixed to a payment instrument on which the bank is author-
ized to act according to the customer agreement. In either case the bank is unable to associate 
the authorization with a particular person. Hence, the bank may similarly be justified in 
including in the customer agreement a tenn authorizing the bank to act on a payment order 
that was issued according to the agreed-upon security procedures. Effectively, such a tenn is 
designed to estop the corporate customer from pleading that the person who affixed the 
facsimile signature or inserted the card and used the right code was not authorized to do so. 
For its part, however, a customer who followed the security procedure in issuing a payment 
order expects the procedure to be reliable and that the bank will properly verify as to whether 
it has been followed. In a sense, this lowers the bank's verification duty from being absolute 
to that of due care. Indeed, in the United States of America, prior to the adoption of article 4A 
of the Unifonn Commercial Code (UCC),26 Walker v Texas Commerce Bank27 stated that in 
acting on a payment order the receiving bank is under a duty to 'implement commercially 
reasonable internal procedures designed to process [a payment order] in accordance with [the 
sender's] instructions, to verify the accuracy of, and compliance with, instructions, to detect 
and minimize inaccuracy, and act diligently to remedy errors'.28 This is in line with the 
receiving bank's 'duty to use reasonable care and skill' in carrying out instructions contained 
in a payment order, set out in England in Royal Products Ltd v Midland Bank Ltd.29 Both 
such statements reflect a principle broad enough to cover the receiving bank's duties in carry-
ing out the verification of the authenticity of the payment instructions. 
23 National Bank of Virginia v Nolting supra note 5. 
24 See, for example, Perini Corp v First National Bank of Habersham City 553 F 2d 398 (5th Cir Ga 1977). 
25 This is so, as under s 91(2) of the Bills of Exchange Act 1882, the seal of a corporation may be an 
equivalent to a signature. Trne, Chalmers and Guest on Bills of Exchange and Pro111isso1y Notes 16 ed by 
AG Guest (2005) questions (at 154 '1[ 3-023) the adequacy of 'a lithograph or a stamped facsimile of a 
signature' and yet arguably this is not in a context of an authorizing resolution. 
26 Article 4A of the Uniform Commercial Code was approved in 1989 by the American Law Institute (ALI) 
and the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Law (NCCUSL) for adoption by the 
various states. By March 1996 it had been adopted throughout the United States of America. 
27 635 F Supp 678 (SD Tex 1986). 
28 At 682. 
29 [1981] 2 Lloyd's LR 194 198 (QB). 
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In endeavouring to meet negligent customers' pleas designed to reallocate unauthorized 
h~ n l,-,_., n-1~:i·v 
-- ------- ------..1 
some cases, non-negligent banks may, however, wish to escape liability even where custom-
ers were not negligent. Such is the case, for example, where banks provided a reliable security 
procedure which they diligently followed. In tum, customers wish to remind banks that they 
are 'custodians of the customer's money' providing for 'a safe place of deposit' ,31 so as to 
leave banks liable, at least as long as no fault (or even no gross negligence) has been attrib-
uted to the customer. 
Against the background of very little case law, it cannot be anticipated that under the com-
mon law a proper balance between the legitimate expectations of the bank and the customer 
will be established soon enough to satisfy certainty. Left to their own mischief, and without 
violating rules that preclude them from disclaiming their own due care obligations,32 banks 
successfully managed to invoke contractual terms that allowed them to escape liability not 
only when the customer was negligent. Rather, such terms released banks also when they acted 
on a counterfeit facsimile signature placed on a cheque33 or counterfeit wire instructions34 as 
long as they were effectively acting without knowledge of the ingenuity, or at least without 
gross negligence. This was so even if the fraudster was a complete outsider to the customer's 
organization who accessed relevant information without any fault of the customer or someone 
in its organization. This, however, appears to go too far in overlooking banks' traditional role 
according to which they are perceived to be 'custodians of the customer's money' providing 
for 'a safe place of deposit' .35 
Article 4A of the UCC contains an elaborate scheme of loss allocation for unauthorized 
wire transfers36 which purports to achieve the right balance.37 Briefly stated, under that 
scheme, the customer is liable to the receiving bank for the amount of any authorized pay-
ment order for which the customer is bound under the law of agency. The customer is also 
liable for the amount of any payment order, including an unauthorized one, whose authen-
ticity was properly verified pursuant to a commercially reasonable security procedure agreed 
upon between the customer and the bank. However, such an unauthorized order does not bind 
the customer where it is otherwise agreed, or where the customer proves that the order was 
not caused by a person other than an interloper. Accordingly, the risk of an unauthorized 
payment order falls initially on the bank. Such risk shifts to the customer if the bank proves 
its good-faith compliance with an agreed-upon commercially reasonable security procedure. 
The risk shifts back to the bank when the loss is proved by the customer to have been caused 
by an interloper or is allocated to the bank by agreement. 
This essay assesses the success of the UCC article 4A scheme in implementing a correct 
balance between the expectations of the bank and customers. It discusses the statutory 
provisions and their interpretation by case law. It concludes that, in the final analysis, the 
scheme under UCC article 4A is a great leap forward. At the same time, the essay calls for an 
30 A bank's negligence allows a negligent customer to shift at least part of the loss back to the bank: see, for 
example, UCC ss 3-406 and 4-406 in the United States of America. 
31 National Bank of Virginia v Nolting supra note 5. 
32 As, for example, under UCC s 4-103(a) in the United States of America. 
33 Jefferson Parish School Board v First Commerce Corp 669 So 2d 1298 (La Ct App), effectively criticized 
by James Steven Rogers The End of Negotiable Instruments (2012) 135-13 7. 
34 Stan-Ka Auto C01p Ltd v Blinkova [1998] OJ No 1047 (Ont CJ Gen Div) (QL(OJ) Spence J). 
35 National Bank of Virginia v Nolting supra note 5. 
36 UCC art 4A, wire and automated clearing house (ACH) credit transfers (see Prefatory Note to UCC 
art 4A). This essay focuses on wire transfers typically processed over large-value payment systems. 
37 UCC SS 4A-201-204. 
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improvement in statutory language, as well as for an increase in courts' awareness of pertin-
ent policy considerations. 
IS VERIFIED PAYMENT ORDER 'AUTHORIZED'? 
Under section 4A-202(a), '[a] payment order received by the receiving bank is the authorized 
order of the person identified as sender if that person authorized the order or is otherwise 
bound by it under the laws of agency'. 38 Authority can be given to the bank according to the 
tenns of an agreement previously entered into between the bank and customer.39 This will 
typically be a framework agreement to govern future payment orders. Authority could, how-
ever, also be given to the bank by the customer on an ad hoc basis, in the absence of a pre-
existing agreement, and even contrary to the terms of such an agreement.40 
It is, however, recognized that where transmission of the payment order is made electron-
ically, which is the common case in the wire-transfer business, agency concepts are not 
sufficiently helpful to ascertain the sender's authority. The receiving bank which 'may be 
required to act on the basis of a message that appears on a computer screen' is relying on 
verification pursuant to a security procedure, and not on the authority of any particular per-
son. 41 Indeed, a security procedure is not necessarily limited to a computerized enviromnent 
and might apply to a cmmnunication that is transmitted by telephone or in writing.42 How-
ever, in connection with an electronic connnunication, it is not only that '[p ]rndent banking 
practice may require that security procedures be utilized' .43 Rather, effectively, a security pro-
cedure in such a case is indispensable. In fact, to bypass security procedures in an electronic 
envirol1111ent, a receiving bank should have agreed with the customer as to what facts con-
stitute authorization to the bank to act on payment orders purporting to be sent on the cus-
tomer's behalf. Hence, a security procedure is predominantly used for the verification of an 
electronic connnunication. It is in this context that security procedures are discussed in this 
essay. 
Verification is designed to link the payment order to its source so as to 'authenticate' it. 
Effectively, proof of verification pursuant to a security procedure is a step towards proving 
authority.44 In fact, and without using any language to that effect, article 4A creates a rebut-
table presumption that a properly verified payment order has been authorized. Presumption 
38 It goes without saying that a genuine payment order issued by a natural person in his or her own name is 
binding on that person, and as between himself or herself and the receiving bank is authorized in the sense 
of s 4A-202(a). 
39 The construction of such terms was addressed in, for example, Dark Hall Productions LLC v Bank of 
America NA 2012 WL 6202186 (Cal App 2 Dist). 
40 As was alleged (albeit disproved) in Frungillo v Imperia Entm 't Inc 2009 US Dist LEXIS 89863 (DNJ 
2009), where anyway the payment discharged the originator's obligation. 
41 Official Comment 1 to s 4A-203. 
42 See Official Comment to s 4A-201, and, for example, Chavez v Mercantil Commercial Bank 701 F 3d 896 
(CA 11 (Fla) 2012), rvs 'g 2011 US Dist LEXIS 126309 (SD Fla I Nov 2011); Braga Filho v Interaudi 
Bank 2008 US Dist LEXIS 31443 (SDNY 2008); Regatos v North Fork Bank 396 F 3d 493 (2d Cir 2005) 
(for earlier proceedings in the same case, see 257 F Supp 2d 632 (SDNY 2003) and 838 NE 2d 629 (NY 
2005)). 
43 Official Comment 3 to s 4A-203. For the distinction between authorized and verified payment orders, and 
for the fact that security procedures determine verification but not authorization, see Hedged Investment 
Partners v Norwest Bank 578 NW 2d 765 (Minn Ct App 1998). 
44 Possibly, this is the role of verification for consumer payment orders under the EFTA, 15 USC§§ 1693 et 
seq (ss 903(11) and 909) and Regulation E, 12 CFR § 205 (s 205.2(111) and 205.6) under which an 
unauthorized fund transfer is to be distinguished from an authorized one; no 'intennediate' category of 
'verified' fund transfer is said to exist. Hence, proof of verification is one step towards proving authority. 
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may, however, be rebutted only by the customer's proving a specified set of facts; customer's 
providing in subsections (h) and (c) for the elements to be proven by a bank wishing to 
benefit from the presumption, either where no authorization was given, or where there is a 
genuine factual issue as to its existence,45 At the same time, from the same perspective, sec-
tion 4A-203 can be seen as dealing with what is to be proved by a customer wishing to rebut 
the presumption. 
Instead of referring to a presumption of authority, article 4A speaks, however, of the binding 
effect of a payment order that was proved to be verified pursuant to a security procedure, and, 
conversely, of its unenforceability, if certain facts are nonetheless proved by the customer. 
Accordingly, the risk of an unauthorized payment order falls initially on the bank. Such risk 
shifts to the customer if the bank proves its good-faith compliance with an agreed-upon 
commercially reasonable security procedure. The risk shifts back to the bank when the loss is 
proved by the customer to have been caused by an interloper or is allocated to the bank by 
agreement. 46 
VERIFICATION ACCORDING TO AGREED SECURITY PROCEDURE 
Under section 4A-201, a 'security procedure' must be established by agreement between a 
customer and a receiving bank. 'The term does not apply to procedures that the receiving 
bank may follow unilaterally in processing payment orders' .47 The pertinent agreement ought 
to be established for the purpose of 'verifying that a payment order or communication amend-
ing or cancelling, a payment order is that of the customer. ' 48 To the same end, under section 
4A-202(b), effective verification requires an agreement between the bank and the customer 
'that the authenticity of payment orders issued to the bank in the name of the customer as 
sender will be verified pursuant to a security procedure'. 
The agreement providing for the security procedures need not be express or in writing; it 
could be oral or even implied from a course of dealing.49 For evidentiary purposes, however, 
it may be more efficient for a bank to reduce such an agreement to writing. A written agree-
ment is nevertheless needed where the customer refuses a security procedure offered by the 
bank and chooses its own, and the bank wishes to benefit from the presumption under section 
4A-202(c) as to the commercial reasonableness of the security procedure chosen by the cus-
tomer. Typically, such a written agreement will bind the customer to any payment order whose 
45 As in Insoftvision LLC v MB Financial Bank 2011 WL 4036134 (ND Ill). 
46 For a 'textbook' exposition, see, for example, Choice Escrow and Land Title LLC v BancorpSouth Bank 
2013 WL 1121339 (WD Mo). 
47 Official Comment to s 4A-201. This principle was applied in Skyline Int'! Dev v Citibank 706 NE 2d 942 
(Ill App 1998). See also Utility Supply Co v AVB Bank 2010 US Dist LEXIS 126948 (ND Okla 2010). As 
well, in Grabowski v Bank of Boston 997 F Supp 130 (D Mass 1997), the Court drew the obvious con-
clusion that an agreement between the bank and the person alleging to be the customer's authorized agent 
is insufficient to establish effective 'security procedures'. 
48 Under s 4A-201, the agreement may be established for the purpose of 'detecting error in the transmission 
or the content of the payment order or communication'. This, however, is another matter, unrelated to the 
authenticity of a payment order sent in the customer's name, governed bys 4A-205. 
49 Under s l-20l(a)(3). 'Agreement' connotes 'the bargain of the parties in fact, as found in their language 
or inferred from other circumstances, including course of performance, course of dealing, or usage of 
trade'. 'Course of dealing' is defined ins 1-205(1) as 'a sequence of previous conduct between the parties 
to a particular transaction which is fairly to be regarded as establishing a common basis of understanding 
for interpreting their expressions and other conduct.' Corresponding Revised Section l-303(b) is almost 
verbatim. 
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authenticity was verified by the bank in good faith and pursuant to the inferior security pro-
cedure chosen by the customer.50 
From the customer's viewpoint, under section 4A-203(a)(l), an express written agreement 
is required to have the risk of an unauthorized payment order shifted back to the bank, 
notwithstanding the use of the commercially reasonable security procedure. In addition, a 
written agreement or instruction of the customer is required to impose restrictions on the use 
of security procedures with respect to the acceptance of designated payment orders under 
section 4A-202(b). 
Where a customer 'expressly agreed to the use of security passcodes ... and it agreed by 
course of performance to the use of challenge questions, having cooperated in setting up 
answers to such question', the court held that 'there [was] no genuine dispute that it agreed to 
the core security procedures visible to users'. 51 It was also held that a security procedure 
chosen unilaterally by the bank pursuant to the customer's authorization is established by 
agreement.52 As well, 'agreement' may be evidenced by the customer's lmowledge that the 
bank uses the procedure to verify payment orders and is not breached by the bank by merely 
unilaterally changing the procedure name. 53 
There are precedents allowing the bank to rely on the customer's agreement and 
acknowledgement of the commercial reasonableness of the 'security procedure' .54 Arguably, 
however, such an agreement is, contrary to section 4A-202(f), an invalid waiver by the cus-
tomer of its rights under section 4A-202. Thereunder, liability for unauthorized payment 
orders is limited only to those properly verified according to what the court views, rather than 
what the customer concedes to be, a 'coll1lllercially reasonable' security procedure. 
Where a valid agreement exists, under section 4A-202(b), a payment order received by the 
bank is effective as the order of the customer, whether or not authorized, where it was accepted 
by the bank in good faith and upon compliance with an agreed-upon commercially reasonable 
security procedure. 55 
As for its contents, under section 4A-201, '[a] security procedure may require the use of 
algorithms or other codes, identifying words or numbers, encryption, callback procedures, or 
similar security devices'. At the same time, ' [ c ]omparison of a signature on a payment order 
or communication with an authorized specimen signature of the customer is not by itself a 
50 Query if by such agreement the customer does not waive its right (under s 4A-203(a)(2)) to avoid liability 
by proving that the fraud was perpetrated by an interloper (such as an employee of the bank). See Paul S 
Turner 'The UCC drafting process and six questions about article 4A: is there a need for revisions to the 
Uniform Funds Transfer Law?' (1994) 28 Loyola of Los Angeles LR 351at360-363. 
51 Patco Constr Co v People's United Bank 2011 US Dist LEXIS 58112 at *104 (D Me 2011), revs 'don 
other grounds, 684 F 3d 197 (1st Cir 2012). 
52 Certainly, as long as it is commercially reasonable, as required from any security procedure (see further 
below), such a security procedure is valid. See Braga Filho v Interaudi Bank supra note 42, which was 
distinguished in Chavez v Mercantil Commercial Bank supra note 42, where the majority did not read the 
particular agreement as authorizing the bank to choose a 'security procedure'. 
53 Experi-Metal Inc v Comerica Bank 2010 US Dist LEXIS 68149 (ED Mich 2010). An 'agreement' was 
found to exist in that case even where knowledge of the procedure by the customer was in relation to pay-
ments received and not sent by it. 
54 For example, Experi-Metal v Comerica Bank supra note 53; Transamerica Logistic Inc v JPMorgan 
Chase Bank NA 2008 US Dist LEXIS 112708 (SD Tex 2008). 
55 Compare All American Siding & Windows v Bank of America 367 SW 3d 490 (Tex App 2012), where the 
court determined only the existence of an agreement. However, the chance is that in the facts of the case 
the security procedure (consisting oflogging in using the company ID and a user ID with each user having 
a specific 'digital certificate') was in any event commercially reasonable. 
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security procedure' .56 Mere voice recognition is not, by itself, a security procedure. Neverthe-
element of an otherwise computerized effective security procedure. 57 
Under section 4A-202(c), commercial reasonableness ofa security procedure is a guestlon 
of law. As explained in Comment 4 to section 4A-203: 'It is appropriate to make the finding 
concerning commercial reasonability a matter of law because security procedures are likely to 
be standardized in the banking industry and a question of law standard leads to more predict-
ability concerning the level of security that a bank must offer to its customers.' 
In determining the commercial reasonableness of a security procedure, consideration will 
be given to 'the wishes of the customer expressed to the bank, the circumstances of the cus-
tomer lmown to the bank, including the size, type, and frequency of payment orders normally 
issued by the customer to the bank, alternative security procedures offered to the customer, 
and security procedures in general use by customers and receiving banks similarly situated' .58 
Taking into account that ' [ v ]erification entails labor and equipment costs that can vary 
greatly depending upon the degree of security that is sought', Comment 4 to section 4A-203 
states: 
'A security procedure is not commercially unreasonable simply because another procedure might 
have been better or because the judge ... would have opted for a more stringent procedure. The stand-
ard is not whether the security procedure is the best available. Rather it is whether the procedure is 
reasonable for the particular customer and the particular bank, which is a lower standard. On the other 
hand, a security procedure that fails to meet prevailing standards of good banking practice applicable 
to the particular bank should not be held to be commercially reasonable.' 
While whether a particular security procedure is 'commercially reasonable' is a question of 
law, compliance by the receiving bank with the procedure is, in each case, a question of 
fact.59 
Where the customer rejects a commercially reasonable security procedure offered by the 
bank in favour of a security procedure of its own choice, the offering bank may benefit from a 
presmnption of commercial reasonableness attributed to the security procedure selected by 
the customer. Thus, under section 4A-202(c): 
'A security procedure is deemed to be commercially reasonable if (i) the security procedure was 
chosen by the customer after the bank offered, and the customer refused, a security procedure that was 
commercially reasonable for that customer, and (ii) the customer expressly agreed in writing to be 
bound by any payment order, whether or not authorized, issued in its name and accepted by the bank 
in compliance with the security procedure chosen by the customer.' 
This recognizes that an informed customer may refuse a commercially reasonable security 
procedure offered by the bank and insist on using a higher risk and more convenient or 
cheaper procedure. In such a case, the loss from an unauthorized but properly verified pay-
ment order is not shifted to the bank, even if the security procedure chosen by the customer 
does not meet the commercial reasonableness standard.60 Nonetheless, to be protected from 
56 Section 4A-201. At the same time, a comparison of a test key will constitute a security procedure. See 
ReAmerica SA v Wells Fargo Bank Int'l 2008 US Dist LEXIS 30614 (SDNY 2008), aff'd ReAmerica SA v 
Wells Fargo Bank Int'l 577 F 3d 102 at 106 (2d Cir 2009). 
57 Experi-Metal v Comerica Bank supra note 53. 
58 Section 4A-202(c). For a detailed analysis, see, for example, Patco Constr v People's United Bank supra 
note 51 (2011) at *108, as well the reversing judgment supra note 51 (2012) at 210-11, reaching the 
reverse conclusion in the facts of the case. 
59 See Centre-Point Merchant Bank v American Express Bank 43 UCC Rep Serv 2d 372 (SDNY 2000). 
60 Official Comment 4 to s 4A-203. 
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the failure of a security procedure chosen by the customer, the bank must have originally 
offered the customer a commercially reasonable security procedure. 
In Choice Escrow and Land Title v BankcorpSouth,61 'on two different occasions' the cus-
tomer 'was offered the opportunity to employ 'Dual Control' 62 in sending payment orders. 
Such procedure required that each electronic wire transfer be initiated by two individuals acti-
ng on behalf of the customer, each having a distinct ID and acting separately. Fearing that 
reliance on the need to constantly have two authorized employees present in the office would 
prove costly, the customer declined and selected a system that by itself was conunercially 
reasonable and yet did not prevent a hacker from diverting funds overseas. Recognizing that 
'[t]he tension in modern society between security and convenience is on full display in this 
litigation',63 the court nevertheless found that in any event two authorized employees were in 
the office at the same time. Thus effectively taking into account 'circumstances of the cus-
tomer known to the bank' as required under section 4A-202(b), the comi held that the 'Dual 
Control' procedure was commercially reasonable. 
To benefit from the protection under section 4A-202(b) for an unauthorized but verified 
payment order, the bank must prove64 that it accepted the payment order in good faith, that it 
complied with the commercially reasonable security procedure,65 and that it accepted the pay-
ment order 'in compliance with ... any written agreement or instruction of the customer 
restricting acceptance of payment orders issued in the name of the customer' .66 However, the 
bank is not required to follow an instruction that violates a written agreement with the cus-
tomer or notice of which is not received at a time and in a manner affording the bank a 
reasonable opportunity to act on it before the payment order is accepted.67 
Under section 4A-105(a)(6), 'good faith' connotes honesty in fact and the observance of 
reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing. While the first prong-'honesty in fact'-is 
subjective, the second prong-'the observance of reasonable commercial standards of fair 
dealing'-is objective. 68 Particularly as to the latter, it is not all that clear what the bank has 
to show in order to prove that in accepting a payment order it acted in good faith. 69 It was 
argued in Experi-Metal Inc v Comerica Bank70 that the acceptance by a receiving bank of 
instructions to pay to unusual destinations and at an accelerated frequency indicated a breach 
of this condition. Initially, in finding a genuine issue of material fact with respect to that 
point, the court did not elaborate on the knowledge requirement for the receiving bank, 
particularly in the context of a mechanical operation such as the issue of payment orders 
61 Choice Escrow and Land Title v BancorpSouth Bank supra note 46. 
62 At *6. 
63 At *9. 
64 Under s 4A-105(a)(7), 'prove' with respect to a fact connotes assuming the burden of establishing that 
fact. Under s 1-201(8), 'burden of establishing' a fact connotes the burden of persuading the triers of fact 
that the existence of that fact is more probable than its non-existence 
65 See, for example, Utility Supply v AVE Bank supra note 47, where the court was prepared to treat the cus-
tomer's negligence claim with respect to the receiving bank's failure to follow its own security procedure 
as an action for the breach of the agreed-upon commercially reasonable security procedure. 
66 Section 4A-202(b)(ii). Compliance with security procedures is an important issue of fact that precludes 
summary judgment in the bank's favour: see Schroeder v Capital One Financial C01p 665 F Supp 2d 219 
(EDNY 2009). 
67 Section 4A-202(b). See, for example, Experi-Metal v Comerica Bank supra note 53. 
68 Experi-Metal Inc v Comerica Bank 2011 US Dist LEXIS 62677 (ED Mich 13 June 2011), aff'ng Experi-
Metal v Comerica Bank supra note 53. 
69 Turner op cit note 51 at 363-364. 
70 Experi-Metal v Comerica Bank supra note 53. 
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verified according to agreed-upon security procedures. Ultimately, however, the trier of fact 
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the book transfers that enabled the criminal to fond tl1ose orders; the $5 million overdraft 
created by those book transfers in what is regularly a zero balance accm\nt; [the origina:tor]'s 
limited prior wire activity; the destinations imd beneficiaries of the funds; and [the receiving 
bank]' s knowledge of prior and the current phishing attempts'. 71 In the absence of evidence 
presented by the receiving bank conveying the commercially reasonable standards of fair 
dealing,72 he was thus 'inclined to find that a bank dealing fairly with its customer ... would 
have detected and/or stopped the fraudulent wire activity earlier'. 73 
LOSS ALLOCATION UNDER THE STATUTE 
Under section 4A-202(b), 'a payment order ... is effective as the order of the customer, 
whether or not authorized', if it is verified pursuant to the agreed-upon security procedure. 
The effect of this provision is to place the risk of loss on the customer if an unauthorized pay-
ment order is accepted by the receiving bank after verification by the bank in compliance with 
a commercially reasonable security procedure. 74 
Section 4A-203 provides for two exceptions. The first reflects the limits to the rationale of 
section 4A-202(b). The second recognizes the parties' power to contract out of some pro-
visions of article 4A. Thus, underlying the customer's responsibility for an unauthorized but 
verified payment order is the assumption that information on the security procedure facili-
tating compliance and successful verification is likely to have been made available to the 
wrongdoer by the customer. To that end, section 4A-203(a)(2) effectively places on the cus-
tomer an obligation to safeguard confidential security infonnation to prevent breaches of the 
agreed-upon security procedures.75 Under that provision, the customer may avoid the loss 
resulting from payment of an unauthorized but verified payment order by proving that neither 
breach of trust nor a leak occurred at its end. This means that the customer is not responsible 
for the amount of the payment order if it proves that-
' ... the order was not caused, directly or indirectly, by a person (i) entrusted at any time with duties 
to act for the customer with respect to payment orders or the security procedure, or (ii) who obtained 
access to transmitting facilities of the customer or who obtained, from a source controlled by the 
customer and without authority of the receiving bank, information facilitating breach of the security 
procedure, regardless of how the information was obtained or whether the customer was at fault. 
Information includes any access device, computer software, or the like.' 
The customer must then prove that the order was not caused by a person other than an inter-
loper. 76 Evidence needed by the customer in order to meet the required burden of proof77 is 
likely to be generated by the criminal and internal investigations conducted in the aftermath 
of the breach of security. 78 
71 At *37-38. 
72 At *38. 
73 Ibid. Conversely, in Patco Constr v People's United Bank supra note 51 (2011), rvrs'd supra note 51 
(2012), a prompt advice to the customer sufficed. ' 
74 Official Comment 5 to s 4A-203. 
75 Travelers Cas & Sur Co of America v Bank of America NA 2010 US Dist LEXIS 30817 (ND Ill). 
76 Or, as in Transamerica Logistic v JP Morgan Chase Bank supra note 54, the customer must prove that the 
disputed transfer orders 'were caused by a person entrusted by [the customer] to order wire transfers or by 
an unauthorized person who gained access to [the customer's] User ID and password from a source con-
trolled by [the customer].' 
77 See ss 1-201(8) and 4A-105(a)(7). 
78 See Official Comment 5 to s 4A-203. 
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Section 4A-203(a)(l) provides for a second exception to the customer's responsibility for 
an unauthorized but properly verified payment order. The loss resulting from such a payment 
may be shifted, in whole or in part, to the receiving bank by express written agreement 
between the bank and the customer. 
In attempting to shift to its bank losses caused by unauthorized but properly verified pay-
ment orders, a customer may however encounter several difficulties. 
In the first instance, banks are unlikely to expressly agree in writing to assume this risk, as 
mandated by the second exception. 
Secondly, a few statutory limitations and ambiguities exist in the quoted language of sec-
tion 4A-203(a)(2), providing for the first exception. (a) It is true that, under clause (i), it is not 
loss caused by any employee of the customer that appears to fasten liability on the customer; 
rather, it must be loss caused by a 'person ... entrusted at any time with duties to act for the 
customer with respect to payment orders or the security procedure'. At the same time, how-
ever, under clause (ii), the customer is also bound by loss caused by any 'person ... who 
obtained access to transmitting facilities of the customer'. Thus, having 'obtained access to 
transmitting facilities of the customer', an employee not covered by clause (i) may neverthe-
less fall under clause (ii). (b) Regardless, is the 'obtained access to transmitting facilities' in 
clause (ii) (which precludes the customer from avoiding liability) limited to physical access, 
or rather, does it cover also 'virtual' access from a remote terminal or computer? Official 
Comment 5 to section 4A-203 speaks of 'access to transmitting facilities through an access 
device or other software', which supports the 'virtual' access interpretation.79 Whether access 
must be given by the customer voluntarily, so that at least in the absence of fault by the cus-
tomer, a hacker will not be a person covered by clause (ii), may be an open question. 80 Even 
if the customer's responsibility is limited to cases where access is voluntarily given, there 
may be circumstances under which 'access' is fraudulently induced, negligently given, or 
inadvertently surrendered for purposes other than the dispatch of a payment order purportedly 
by the customer. What is required under clause (ii) is causation by either the obtaimnent of 
access to the customer's transmitting facilities, or the obtainment from a source controlled by 
the customer (and without the receiving bank's authority) ofinfonnation facilitating a breach 
of the security procedure. Fault of the customer is said not to be a factor only with respect to 
the second prong, that of the obtainment of information and not the obtainment to access to 
facilities. However, there is no reason to suppose that the obtainment of access to the cus-
tomer's facility by fraudulently inducing the customer or taking advantage of the customer's 
negligence will excuse the customer. (c) Clause (ii) allocates responsibility to the customer 
for a payment order caused by a person 'who obtained, from a source controlled by the cus-
tomer and without authority of the receiving bank, information facilitating breach of the 
security procedure, regardless of how the infonnation was obtained or whether the customer 
was at fault'. Information is broadly defined to include 'any access device, computer soft-
ware, or the like'. This seems to fasten responsibility to the customer only where loss caused 
by information originated in an area under its control. But how far does the customer's control 
79 See, for example, RW Ludwig, S Scanio and S Szary 'Malware and fraudulent electronic funds transfers: 
who bears the loss?' (2010) 16 Fidelity LJ I 01. 
80 A negative answer-meaning that access preventing the customer to avoid liability need not necessarily 
be given voluntarily-was assumed by the court in Transamerica Logi,stic v JP Morgan Chase Bank supra 
note 54. In that case, the user ID and password had allegedly been saved to a laptop that was confiscated 
by law enforcement officials. The court assumed that this prevented the customer from avoiding liability 
for payment orders subsequently issued and properly verified by the receiving bank under an agreed-upon 
commercially reasonable security procedure. 
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extend? What about access obtained, or infonnation received, from a third-party communi-
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a system 'is deemed to be an agent of the sender'. As such, does the system become 'a source 
controlled by the customer', and its transmitting facilities become those 'of the customer', so 
as to make the customer responsible for losses caused by breach of security in such a system? 
Such a conclusion is not inevitable and in my view ought to be rejected; agency under section 
4A-206 is to be limited to the terms of a payment order actually transmitted by the customer 
through the system. Nevertheless, this view may not be universally shared and the question 
remams open. 
Thirdly, allocation of losses caused by verified unauthorized orders under article 4A is 
asymmetric. Under section 4A-202, the bank avoids liability by proving compliance with an 
agreed-upon commercially reasonable security procedure and other contracts. Conversely, to 
shift liability back to the bank, and in the absence of (an unlikely) contract to the contrary, the 
customer is required to prove under section 4A-203, that the payment order was not caused 
'directly or indirectly' by a breach of security at its own end. The latter set of facts is much 
harder to prove than compliance with the security procedure. Certainly, the customer will not 
avoid liability by merely proving due diligence or compliance with commercially reasonable 
standards in controlling both access to its transmittal facilities and infonnation held by a 
source controlled by it. Furthermore, as will be shown below, according to Patco Constr v 
People's United Bank, 81 in principle, even where the bank's security procedure is not found to 
be commercially reasonable, a customer may be found to be in breach of a duty to the bank 
and thus bear the loss. It was even argued in the court below in that case that a commercially 
reasonable agreed-upon security procedure unintentionally weakened by the addition to it by 
the bank of new elements (that effectively compromised the elements agreed upon) remains 
commercially reasonable. Unless such practice undermines the good-faith compliance with 
the agreed security procedure, there may not be a way for the customer to introduce this 
aspect into the 'equation'. 82 However, as discussed below, the Court of Appeal ultimately 
declined to find the security procedure, together with the additional elements, to be com-
mercially reasonable. 
In Elite Investigations v Bank of New York, 83 Elite's payment orders were to be issued by 
inputting, through a third-party communication system,84 the security code that appeared on a 
credit card of the company president, together with the president's social security number and 
date of birth. This must be taken to form a 'security procedure' the commercial reasonable-
ness of which was not questioned by the court. A fraudulent Elite employee, who had been 
removed from the signature card of the company as a result of an earlier fraud, but who 
nevertheless remained authorized to review its bank and charge-card statements, and who was 
entrusted with a corporate charge card, initiated electronic funds transfers under the presi-
dent's name and misappropriated the funds for his own personal use. 85 Elite sought to chal-
lenge the debits to its bank account on the basis of alleged bank's duties to ensure that the 
81 Supra note 51 (2012) at214-215. 
82 Patco Constr v People's United Bank supra note 51 (2011 ). 
83 Elite Investigations v Bank of NY 13 Misc 3d 1233A (NY Sup Ct 2006). 
84 In the facts of the case, the third-party communication system consisted of American Express and the 
bank it used. For a communication system as an agent of the sender, sees 4A-206. In the facts of the case, 
each payment order initiated an ACH payment that the Court assumed to be governed by art 4A. 
85 The consequences of the corporate customer's failure to give a timely notice of the contested debits, 
caused in the facts of the case by the involvement of the fraud instigator in the review of the bank state-
ment, would have been a matter governed bys 4A-204. The provision is, however, limited to unauthorized 
or unverified payment orders in respect of which the bank is liable in the first place. 
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fraudulent employee had no access to its account as he had been removed from the signatory 
card. Concluding that the bank had no practical way of detem1ining who initiated the funds 
transfers and whether the payment orders were authorized, the court summarily dismissed the 
action. 
In fact, the relevant issue was not whether the payment orders were authorized, but rather 
whether the corporate customer could overcome the bank's reliance on verification pmsuant 
to a commercially reasonable security procedure. In the facts of the case, it is unlikely that the 
corporate customer could have proven that the payment orders were not caused other than by 
an interloper in the sense of section 4A-203(a)(2). Thus, the action may have correctly been 
summarily dismissed, though for the wrong reasons. 
PATCO CONSTRUCTION V PEOPLE'S UNITED BANK EXAMINED 
Patco Construction v People's United Bank86 explored major issues in the interpretation of 
section 4A-202(b) and the resulting loss allocation under it. 87 In this case, in dealing with the 
reasonableness of an agreed security procedure, reliance was put88 on a guidance issued in 
October 2005 by the agencies of the Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council 
(FFIEC) and titled 'Authentication in an Internet Banking Environment' (Guidance). The 
Guidance explained that authentication methodologies involve three basic 'factors': '[s]ome-
thing the user !mows (e.g., password, PIN)'; '[s]omething the user has (e.g., ATM card, smart 
card)'; and '[s]omething the user is (e.g., biometric characteristic, such as a fingerprint)' 
(original emphasis). 
While not endorsing any particular technology for high-risk transactions (such as funds 
transfers to third parties), the Guidance disfavoured a single-factor authentication and 
favoured the implementation by financial institutions of 'multifactor authentication, layered 
security, or other controls reasonably calculated to mitigate ... risks'. 
In the facts of the case, the customer 
' ... agreed to the core security procedures visible to users that comprised the key components of the 
integrated security package used by the Bank. [It] expressly agreed to the use of security passcodes, 
which consisted of a customer ID and customer password and a user ID and user password for each 
authorized user of the customer, ... and it agreed by course of performance to the use of challenge 
questions, having cooperated in setting up answers to such questions and having answered them in the 
course of conducting eB anking.' 
It also 'effectively agreed to monitor its commercial accounts daily'.89 The agreed security 
procedure was strengthened by invisible elements such as risk profiling for the customer, 
device cookies placed onto customers' computers to identify particular computers used to 
access online banking, and subscription to eFraud Network.90 
86 Supra note 51 (2011). 
87 The case, in conjunction with others discussed here, is extensively examined in law reviews. See, for 
example, RK Burrows 'Increased bank liability for online fraud: The effect of Patco Construction Co. v. 
People's United Bank' (2013) 17 North Carolina Banking Institute 381; Salvatore Scanio and Robert W 
Ludwig 'Surging, swift and liable? Cybercrime and electronic payments fraud involving commercial bank 
accounts: who bears the loss?' (2013) 16(10) J of Internet Law 3; M Waite 'In search of the right balance: 
Patco lays the foundation for analyzing the commercial reasonableness of security procedures under UCC 
Article 4A' (2013) 54 Boston College LR E-Supplement 217. 
88 Patco Cons fl· v People's United Bank supra note 51 (2011) at *25-*32. 
89 At *104-*106. 
90 At *34-*38. 
130 GEVA 
Over a period of several days, the alleged fraudulent transfers kept raising the risk scoring. 
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monitoring the account activity daily. With no response from the customer, the bank kept 
executing the payment orders, as neither incorrect password nor incorrect answer to a chal-
lenge question was submitted by the initiator 
In challenging the conunercial reasonableness of the security procedure, the customer 
argued that the authentication procedure did not truly consist of 'layered security.' Thus, 
while authentication required both codes and answers to challenge questions, the effect of 
each stage in which enhanced risk was perceived was to trigger more challenge questions. In 
addition, the customer argued that over time the increased frequency with which challenge 
questions had been asked did not enhance security but increased risk by giving hackers 
greater opportunity to find out the correct answers to them. The District Court rejected these 
arguments and found that the authentication procedure truly consisted of 'layered security.' It 
held that overall, even though it was not optimal, the security procedure certainly met the 
conunercially reasonable standard. Pointing out that in the wake of the transfers the customer 
failed to isolate its computer or forensically preserve the hard drives, the district court con-
cluded that a security breach could have occurred only at the customer's end. It gave a sum-
mary judgment in the bank's favour. 
It is obvious that the District Court in Patco interpreted 'access to transmitting facilities of 
the customer' in section 4A-203(a)(2) as including virtual access by a hacker. The case was 
thus resolved solely on the basis of the bank's good-faith compliance with an agreed-upon 
commercially reasonable security procedure, because the customer was unable to prove that 
its system had not been the source from which the hacker had obtained the information. True, 
the customer was not free of negligence and yet, according to the District Court, its existence 
or absence played no role in the final outcome. 
The United States Court of Appeal of the First Circuit reversed the decision.91 It first 
pointed out that '[a]lthough the bank's security system flagged each of these transactions as 
unusually "high-risk" because they were inconsistent with the timing, value, and geographic 
location of Patco's regular payment orders, the bank's security system did not notify its com-
mercial customers' .92 Specifically overruling the District Court on the effect of the increased 
frequency with which challenge questions had been asked and citing 'Article 4A's mandate 
that security procedures take into account "the circumstances of the customer" known to the 
bank',93 the Court of Appeal was of the view that 
'[The bank] did substantially increase the risk of fraud by asking for security answers for every SI 
transaction, particularly for customers like Patco which had frequent, regular, and high dollar trans-
fers. Then, when it had warning that such fraud was likely occurring in a given transaction, [the bank] 
neither monitored that transaction nor provided notice to customers before allowing the transaction to 
be completed. Because it had the capacity to do all of those things, yet failed to do so, we cannot con-
clude that its security system was commercially reasonable. We emphasize that it was these collective 
failures taken as a whole, rather than any single failure, which rendered [the bank]'s security system 
commercially unreasonable. '94 
Nonetheless, while finding the bank's security procedure to be commercially unreasonable, 
the Court of Appeal declined to give a sununary judgment in Patco's favour. Recognizing the 
limited customer's duty under section 4A-204(a) 'to exercise ordinary care' in advising the 
91 Patco Constr v People's United Bank supra note 51 (2012). 
92 At 197. 
93 At211-212. 
94 At210-211. 
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bank of an unauthorized payment order, a duty that had not been breached by Patco, the Court 
of Appeal declined to treat it as setting the upper limit of the customer's duties to the ex-
clusion of any other and observed that '[i]t is unclear, however, what if any obligations a 
commercial customer has when a bank security's procedure is found to be commercially 
unreasonable'. 95 The Comt of Appeal did not rule out the application of external general prin-
ciples of law in the determination of the matter. Accordingly, it left 'open for the parties to 
brief on remand the question of what, if any, obligations or responsibilities are imposed on a 
commercial customer under Article 4A even where a bank's security system is commercially 
unreasonable' .96 
CONCLUSION 
An authorized payment order may be enforced pursuant to section 4A-202(a), even without 
security procedures. Otherwise, article 4A requires good-faith compliance with an agreed 
commercially reasonable security procedure. This meets banks' expectations. 
In tum, customers wish to remind banks that they are 'custodians of the customer's money' 
providing for 'a safe place of deposit' 97 so as to leave banks liable, even in a case in which an 
agreed-upon cmmnercial reasonable security procedure has been complied with by the bank, 
at least as long as no fault (or even no gross negligence) has been attributed to the customer. 
This expectation is, however, met by article 4A only in part. An unauthorized, albeit properly 
verified, payment order binds the customer, unless the customer proves that the order was 
caused by an interloper. This is a very narrow exception that does not apply where a hacker 
managed to compromise the customer's secmity system even with no, or very little, fault on 
the part of the customer. 98 
In Patco, the Court of Appeal left 'open ... the question of what, if any, obligations or 
responsibilities are imposed on a commercial customer under Article 4A even where a bank's 
security system is commercially unreasonable'. 99 Thereby the court appears to exceed banks' 
reasonable expectations and to increase coll1111ercial customers' frustration. Not only are com-
mercial customers not allowed to defend themselves against a non-negligent bank by proving 
that they were also not negligent, but they may lose out even where the bank was in fact 
negligent, because of some (as yet unspecified) duties not even found in article 4A. 
95 At 214-215. 
96 Ibid. 
97 National Bank of Virginia v Nolting supra note 5. 
98 By comparison, under the Cambodia Law on Negotiable Instruments and Payment Transactions, 2005, 
NSIRKM/1005/030, ' ... the person identified as sender on the payment order is not liable, when the per-
son proves ... that the issue of the unauthorized payment ... order was not caused by: (i) The person 
identified as sender, or someone entrusted at any time with duties to act for that person with respect to 
payment transactions or the security procedure; or (ii) Someone who obtained from the person identified 
as sender, or a source controlled by that person, access to that person's transmitting facilities, or infor-
mation, including any access device, computer software, or the like, facilitating breach of the security pro-
cedure.' As well, under art 214(4) of the same statute, '[a] sender of a payment order ... shall exercise 
ordinary care in order to prevent forgery and unauthorized issue or alteration of payment orders'. While 
modelled on UCC s 4A-203(a)(2), art 213(2) in Cambodia is less 'demanding' of the customer, and in 
conjunction with art 214(4), is to be read as meaning that absent breach of trust or negligence, a customer 
will not be liable for an unauthorized payment order. See Benjamin Geva 'Payment system modernization 
and law reform in developing nations: lessons from Cambodia and Sri Lanka' (2009) 126 Banking LJ 402 
at 418-419. The statute can be accessed at http://www.nbc.org.kh/download_files/legislation/others_ 
Jaw_ eng/ law_ on_ negotiable.pdf (accessed 18 November 2013 ). 
99 Patco Constr v People's United Bank supra note 51 (2012) at 48. 
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In the final analysis, in attempting to provide for a fair balance between banks and cus-
tomers in the allocation of unauthorized and yet properly verified wire payment order losses, 
the scheme under article 4A is a great leap fonvard. However, statutory language must be 
improved and courts' awareness of pertinent policy considerations increased. This is not only 
in order to eliminate a few uncertainties100 but also to fine-tune the overall loss allocation 
scheme so as to establish a better balance between the legitimate expectations and interests of 
relevant parties. 
100 Drafting deficiencies are set out in the text to footnotes 79-82. 
